By Christian Harm
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Extra resources for Bank Management Between Shareholders and Regulators
A shift in Antitrust policy, and deregulation efforts in general are an important reason, especially in the case of banking. Finally, mergers may simply be seen in the context of the theory of the firm55: a changing market environment requires organizational adaptation. Liquid capital markets may then represent a conduit for change, be it through mergers or spin-offs. Thus, rather than being part of a disciplinary device to ensure managerial accountability, financial markets are a conduit for the market for organizational structures.
Here, Cole and Mehran (1998) support the notion against financial mutuals by demonstrating that those institutions that convert from mutual to stock S&L’s, performance is improving significantly. A caveat of such findings is that the conversion decision is potentially endogenous for technology or regulatory reasons70, which would cloud the inference that organizational form is responsible for the observed performance improvements. Nonetheless, Cole and Mehran (1998) also find that the change in management ownership is positively correlated with the postconversion change in performance, which supports a positive governance role for management ownership stakes in this setting, and stands in contrast to the above findings by Aharony, Falk and Lin (1996).
1 Stock market gains The early literature followed in the footsteps of Jensen and Ruback (1983), who examined the wealth effects of merger activity in general to conclude that mergers did generally create wealth, and that this wealth creation was to be seen as an increase in shareholder value due to a more active market for corporate control. Accordingly, it was examined, whether bank mergers increased shareholder value. Here, Desai and Stover (1985) found that bidder BHC’s experienced positive abnormal returns upon announcement as well as approval of a merger bid.